On a not so hot Sunday evening of August 3, Portuguese TV networks broadcasted an unusual and dramatic statement from the governor of the Portuguese central bank Banco de Portugal, proclaiming the collapse of Banco Espírito Santo, S.A., and its break up into a ‘good bank’ (Novo Banco) and a ‘bad bank’ (BES)
Let’s start with being provocative: The utterly corrupt path leading to the Greek debt default theater is filled with faux EU pressures, chicanery and bribes, overt and implied, by all 11 sides.
The Riksbank, Sweden’s central bank, has long expressed its concern over the rising level of household debt and the related price increases in the housing market...
The Kabulbank scam in Afghanistan may be the largest theft of depositor money per capita the world has ever experienced. This is the second of a three-part series chronicling the unfolding and ultimate resolution of that scandal.
To some degree capital regulation has become synonymous with prudential regulation. At its most basic level, capital, in the form of shareholder equity, provides a cushion to cover unexpected increases in liabilities or decreases in asset values.
The Kabulbank scam in Afghanistan may be the largest theft the world has ever experienced. This is the first of a three-part series chronicling the unfolding and ultimate resolution of that scandal.
As the U.S. unemployment rate dropped below 6 percent in September 2014, The Federal Reserve began to acknowledge that the Great Recession might finally be over and that it would end its program of Large Scale Asset Purchases, commonly known as QE3.
The 2008 financial crisis was a major event, perhaps the most severe financial breakdown in modern history. At the time, many commentators said that we were witnessing a crisis of capitalism, proof that the free market system was inherently unstable.
The Icelandic banking sector was regulated in the same way as its counterparts in other European countries.
Private equity houses have recently made certain strategic investments in fiduciary businesses in the Cayman Islands whilst at the same time two household names in the banking arena are exiting the jurisdiction.
While their financial statements have become significantly more transparent and consistent, it is becoming more difficult to discern the overall message. Investors are presented with an abundance of financial data, but struggle to identify relevant information.
The offshore jurisdictions are commonly thought to be highly secretive, with banking secrecy being an important part of what those jurisdictions offer to businesses and individuals who use them. For example, in 2000, the U.S. Treasury Department issued an advisory notice stating that extra vigilance was required in doing business in the Cayman Islands: “The Cayman Islands remains committed to strict bank secrecy, outside of a limited suspicious transaction reporting and international cooperation regime.”
Banks have in essence changed little since they emerged from being early modern goldsmiths. Their key business remains borrowing and lending. When engaged in that they are crucial to the economy in two ways. They supply a part – in modern economies, by far the greater part – of the stock of money.
Given today’s far greater number of professional economists, one would have thought that monetary reform proposals would be far superior to those of the 1930s. But surprisingly almost the exact opposite is true:
While many other countries have adopted legal provisions giving their bank supervisory authorities the ability to restructure severely troubled banks, appoint special administrators or conservators, arrange purchase-and-assumption transactions and so forth, Cypriot banking legislation did not contain any such provisions until March 2013.
This emerging trend could support much-needed improvements for executive compensation. Debt securities in executive compensation may offer attractive coupon rates, can support Basel III compliance, and can help improve corporate governance in financial institutions.
In June 2008 the combined balance sheets of Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki, Iceland’s three largest banks, were more than ten times the country’s GDP. In October 2008, the high flying Icelandic economy abruptly crashed, and with it the three banks.